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INVALID HARMS:
IMPROPER USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT’S GOOD CAUSE EXEMPTION
Miriam R. Stiefel
Abstract: On October 13, 2017, the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,
U.S. Department of Treasury, and U.S. Department of Labor published two nearly identical
interim final rules in the Federal Register. To do so, the agencies invoked the Administrative
Procedure Act’s good cause exemption, permitting the rules to bypass prepromulgation notice
and comment rulemaking requirements. The interim final rules allowed employers and insurers
that provide group healthcare coverage under the Affordable Care Act to seek constitutional
and moral exemptions—specifically for contraceptives and other preventive health services
coverage. Using the two 2017 interim final rules as an illustration, this Comment considers
whether constitutional and moral objections should qualify as valid reasons for administrative
agencies to invoke the Administrative Procedure Act’s good cause exemption, ultimately
arguing they should not. If valid, this use of constitutional and moral objections would broaden
administrative agencies’ ability to bypass notice and comment rulemaking procedures, thereby
delegitimizing the rulemaking processes and undercutting opportunities for public
participation.

INTRODUCTION
The Administrative Procedure Act1 (APA) governs how federal
administrative agencies promulgate rules.2 Generally, to promulgate rules,
administrative agencies must comply with the APA’s public disclosure
and participation requirements referred to as “notice and comment
rulemaking.”3 Recognizing that notice and comment rulemaking could
take months or years to complete, Congress established the good cause
exemption,4 permitting agencies to bypass the notice and comment
J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. Thank you to Professor
Kathryn Watts for her inspiring law lectures, guidance, and comments. Additionally, thank you to the
Washington Law Review editorial staff for their exceptional work.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. For example, the “‘interpretive rule’ exception allows agencies to skip notice and comment when
the rule to be promulgated merely clarifies or explains an existing statute or rule.” Kristin E. Hickman
& Mark Thomson, Open Minds and Harmless Errors: Judicial Review of Postpromulgation Notice
and Comment, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 264 (2016). There are additional exemptions concerning
military action, foreign affairs, internal agency procedures, and general statements of policies.
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)–(2).
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procedures. The APA’s good cause exemption permits agencies to quickly
enact regulations in emergency situations,5 while protecting the public
from agency abuse of this speedy option.6 Essentially, Congress
established the APA’s good cause exemption to act as an emergency exit
door—to be used sparingly and under special circumstances.7
Under the Donald J. Trump Administration, on October 13, 2017, the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), in collaboration
with the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury) and the U.S. Department
of Labor (DOL), introduced two nearly identical interim final rules
(IFRs): the “Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act”8 (2017
Religious IFR) and the “Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act”9
(2017 Moral IFR). The IFRs established exemptions for employers and
insurers with religious and moral objections from the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) contraceptive coverage requirement.10
After their introduction, many states and nonprofit organizations filed
lawsuits challenging the IFRs’ legality under the U.S. Constitution and
APA.11 On November 15, 2018, the agencies issued two Final Rules
(FRs), solidifying the 2017 IFRs.12 In December 201813 and January
2019,14 federal courts granted complaining states injunctive relief, finding
that both the IFRs’ and FRs’ harms outweighed their benefits and that the
rules were contrary to the ACA. Accordingly, the rules are no longer in
effect. Nonetheless, the process used by the agencies to create the rules
raises questions about whether constitutional or moral harms are valid
reasons to invoke the APA’s good cause exemption.

5. See infra Part I.
6. See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 293; infra Part I.
7. See infra Part I.
8. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under
the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R.
2590, 45 C.F.R. 147) [hereinafter 2017 Religious IFR].
9. Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R.
2590, 45 C.F.R. 147) [hereinafter 2017 Moral IFR].
10. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2713, 124 Stat. 119, 131–
32 (Mar. 23, 2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 (2018)).
11. See infra Part II.
12. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9.
13. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 570–71 (9th Cir. 2018).
14. California v. HHS, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
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In deciding cases about the rules’ legality, the courts never directly
addressed whether litigants could successfully argue that constitutional or
moral harms are valid reasons for invoking the APA’s good cause
exemption.15 In other words, there remains an open question: may
administrative agencies rely on a constitutional issue, such as religious
freedom, or a broad ethical issue, such as moralism, to invoke the good
cause exemption? This Comment addresses that question.
Specifically, this Comment considers whether constitutional and moral
objections should qualify as valid reasons for administrative agencies to
invoke the APA’s good cause exemption, ultimately arguing they should
not.16 In considering these issues, Part I reviews the legislative history and
intent behind the APA’s good cause exemption, as well as judicial review
of the good cause exemption. Part II discusses the ACA’s contraceptive
coverage requirement. It then explores subsequent litigation, legislation,
and agency rulemaking that challenged the requirement—including
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores17 and the 2017 IFRs. Part III then uses the
2017 IFRs to illustrate how constitutional and moral objections are invalid
rationales for invoking the good cause exemption. If broadened to permit
constitutional and moral rationales, the good cause exemption would
cease to be an emergency exit, thereby threatening to end the public’s
opportunity to participate in notice and comment rulemaking.
I.

THE APA’S GOOD CAUSE EXEMPTION

As a participatory democracy, the U.S. government utilizes open
forums and public participation in lawmaking.18 To legitimize these
democratic values, Congress enacted the APA to govern federal

15. For example, instead of deciding whether constitutional or moral harms are invalid, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California balanced the plaintiff states’ interests with
those of employers and insurance companies. The court held that the balance favored the plaintiff
states’ interest “in ensuring that health plans cover contraceptive services with no cost-sharing, as
provided for under the ACA.” Id. at 1298. For additional information see infra Part II.
16. While this Comment acknowledges the many constitutional, statutory, and common law claims
involved in the suits challenging the 2017 IFRs and 2018 FRs, it focuses on courts’ treatment of the
APA’s good cause exemption for constitutional and moral harms.
17. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
18. See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 4 (7th ed.
2007) (“The framers held a strong bias in favor of lawmaking by representative assemblies, and so
they viewed Congress as the prime national policy maker.”).
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administrative agencies’19 formal and informal methods of rulemaking. 20
Pursuant to the APA, notice and comment procedures are an informal
method of rulemaking that Congress enacted to safeguard public
participation21 by providing interested parties the opportunity to weigh in
on an agency’s prospective actions.22 “[B]y mandating ‘openness,
explanation, and participatory democracy’ in the rulemaking process,
these procedures assure the legitimacy of administrative norms.”23
Agency action to solicit, review, and respond to public comments and
questions serve Congress’s and the APA’s goals of transparency and
public participation.24 However, due to the multiple steps involved—
drafting, reviewing, providing notice, commenting, and responding to
comments—notice and comment rulemaking is often a time-consuming
and cumbersome process.25 It may take months or years from the time an
agency provides notice of its intended rule to the time it responds to
comments in a final, published rule.26
Recognizing that administrative rulemaking could be a lengthy
process, Congress established the good cause exemption,27 permitting
agencies to bypass the public disclosure and participation requirements of
notice and comment in certain circumstances. The APA’s good cause

19. It is part of the President’s duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3. To carry out this duty, Presidents have exerted control over administrative agencies, like
HHS, and those agencies’ regulatory decisions. Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control,
114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 688–89 (2016). The APA governs how administrative agencies may enact
regulations. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
20. Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Requirements
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 320–21 (1989). Federalregister.gov is the
primary platform facilitating public participation in agency rulemaking. About This Site, FED. REG.,
https://www.federalregister.gov/reader-aids/government-policy-and-ofr-procedures/about-this-site
[https://perma.cc/XHD6-45BQ]. On this website, interested parties may review proposed and final
agency actions, as well as submit comments and questions about proposed agency action. See FED.
REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/ [https://perma.cc/DVK7-RYLD]. In certain instances, the APA
requires agencies to publish responses to submitted comments in the final rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
22. Id. § 553(c); see also Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 375 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (discussing Congress’s intent that the APA provide interested parties the ability to be heard
by agencies), vacated on other grounds, 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
23. Air Transp. Ass’n, 900 F.2d at 375 (citing Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027
(D.C. Cir. 1978)).
24. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
25. See Reg Map, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., https://reginfo.gov/public/reginfo/Regmap/index.jsp
[https://perma.cc/5LNW-CDWM].
26. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 291.
27. Supra note 4.
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exemption28 states that an agency is excused from notice and comment
rulemaking “when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the
finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest.”29
This Part focuses on the good cause exemption. It discusses the
procedural steps agencies must take to invoke the good cause exemption
and issue a rule, as well as the elements required to justify a rule. This Part
then proceeds to explore the good cause exemption’s legislative history
and intent, utilization by agencies, and judicial review.
A.

Legislative History and Intent

When Congress enacted the APA in 1946,30 it clarified the good cause
exemption requirements to ensure the exemption would not be used as a
political lever.31 Court interpretations of Congressional intent explain that
Congress designed the good cause exemption to be used in “situations of
emergency or necessity,” as opposed to being used as “an ‘escape clause’
in the sense that any agency has discretion to disregard its terms or the
facts. A true and supported or supportable finding of necessity or
emergency must be made and published.”32 Thus, Congress enacted the
good cause exemption “to accommodate situations where the policies
promoted by public participation in rulemaking are outweighed by the
countervailing considerations of effectiveness, efficiency, expedition, and
reduction in expense, while assuring that agency decisions are based on
facts.”33 Accordingly, administrative agencies are only to use the good
cause exemption as an emergency exit door.
Agencies invoking the good cause exemption tend to classify
regulations published in the Federal Register as “interim final rules” or
“final rules.”34 IFRs are “interim” because they announce an agency’s
intention to publish a revised and final rule later.35 These rules are also
“final” because they “take effect immediately upon publication or shortly
28. Id. at 264.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B).
30. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
31. Anne J. O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 910–11 (2008).
32. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing S. DOC. NO.
79-248, at 200 (1946)).
33. Lavilla, supra note 20, at 320–21.
34. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 903.
35. Id.
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thereafter,” superseding a comment period.36 In other words, once an IFR
is published, the agency invites comments37 and “indicat[es]that it may
revise the rule in the future based on the comments it receives—thus
leading to the label of an ‘interim-final’ rule.”38 A revised IFR is labeled
as a “final rule” (FR).39 If a FR is not promulgated, an IFR may be relied
on, essentially acting as a final rule.40 Alternatively, an IFR may include
a sunset date by which it will lapse.41 Although the APA does not mandate
that rules justified by the good cause exemption be interim, many are.42
Because IFRs are required to engage in a postpromulgation notice and
comment period, IFRs face less scrutiny than FRs, which become final
regardless of a participatory period.43 Agencies typically justify
publishing IFRs by using the good cause exemption.44
The good cause exemption is touted for its flexibility but also criticized
as a loophole.45 “There is a general public reluctance to permit an agency
acting under a delegated authority to abandon the extensive checks on
agency power” created by the APA.46
When agencies limit affected persons’ ability to prepare for a new
rule—e.g., by promulgating an IFR—this reluctance is heightened.47
Skeptics of the good cause exemption argue that “it is hard to see why an
agency would ever go to the trouble of undertaking prepromulgation
notice and comment when it could more easily promulgate an interimfinal rule now and then undertake postpromulgation notice and comment
more or less at its leisure.”48
36. Id.
37. This Comment refers to the procedures before an IFR is published as a prepromulgation notice
and comment period, and the procedures after an IFR is published as a postpromulgation notice and
comment period.
38. Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 748
(1999) (emphasis added).
39. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 901–02.
40. Id. at 903.
41. Asimow, supra note 38, at 731 n.104.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018); see also O’Connell, supra note 31, at 948.
43. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 902–03.
44. Id. at 948.
45. Lavilla, supra note 20, at 322 (citing K. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 280–94 (2d ed. 1988)).
46. Babette E.L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An Examination of State and Federal Agency
Emergency Powers, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3339, 3341 (2013).
47. United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099, 1105 (1977).
48. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 293. Courts, agencies, and scholars use the terms
postpromulgation or post-hoc to refer to comment periods that occur after an interim final rule is
published in the Federal Register, as opposed to prepromulgation comments as part of “normal” notice
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Administrative law scholar and University of Minnesota Professor of
Law, Kristin Hickman, illustrates agency-specific abuse of the good cause
exemption through Treasury’s rulemaking history.49 Hickman reported
the following:
Treasury and the IRS typically put a lot more effort into
temporary Treasury regulations than proposed ones, for the
simple reason that temporary regulations are legally binding and
proposed ones are not. If agencies are less likely to take seriously
postpromulgation comments than they are prepromulgation
comments, it is hard to argue convincingly that postpromulgation
notice and comment are a meaningful substitute for
prepromulgation notice and comment.50
Treasury’s pattern of issuing binding, yet “temporary,” regulations
demonstrates how agencies circumvent the checks and balances put in
place to prevent abuse: namely, prepromulgation notice and comment.51
As Pepperdine University School of Law Professor Babette E.L. Boliek
notes, “statutory language and structure of the ‘good cause’ exemption is
so broad, and effective review of agency action so low, [] agency
accountability and transparency are sacrificed.”52 The lack of
accountability and transparency leaves agency rulemaking open to
potential abuse of the good cause exemption.
In the 1950s, some members of Congress sought “to limit the use of the
good cause exemption in rulemaking to cases where ‘immediate adoption
of the rule [was] necessary for the preservation of the public health, safety,
or morals.’”53 However, the word “moral”54 was excluded from the APA’s
amendments.55 Practicing administrative law attorney and Universidad
Pontificia Comillas Professor Juan J. Lavilla explains Congress may have
excluded the word because “‘morals’ expresses a value-laden concept
lending itself to subjective interpretations,” and “the adoption of this
proposal would not improve the exemption.”56 So while one Congress
and comment rulemaking. Id. at 263 nn.5–6, 273 (citing N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d
1038, 1049–50 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Boliek, supra note 46, at 3343–44.
53. See Lavilla, supra note 20, at 324 (emphasis added) (citing S. DOC. 91-49, at 365 (1969)).
54. Throughout this Comment the Author uses the terms “moral” and “morals” interchangeably
when referring to the statutory and legislative history of the APA.
55. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2018).
56. See Lavilla, supra note 20, at 324 n.29.
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member mentioned the word “morals” in discussions regarding amending
§ 553,57 the term moral was excluded from the Act.
In addition to the APA, Congress further expressed its intent for
agencies to engage in notice and comment rulemaking through the
promulgation of agency-specific statutes.58 Some agency-specific statutes
explicitly cite § 553’s notice and comment rulemaking requirements.59
While other agency-specific statutes do not explicitly cite the APA, they
utilize the same notice and comment requirements.60 As long as agencies
meet their respective agency-specific statutory requirements and comply
with the APA, they may establish internal guidelines and procedures for
informal rulemaking and the use of the good cause exemption.61
Essentially, these procedures act as a guide and limit agency rulemaking.62
Both Congress’s agency-specific statutes and agencies’ internal
procedures bolster the APA’s requirements and their credibility. When
neither Congress nor an agency has created additional statutes or
procedures governing the use of the good cause exemption, agencies
default to the APA’s rules.63
B.

An Agency’s Choice: Invoking the Good Cause Exemption

Agencies invoke the good cause exemption frequently. According to
the Government Accountability Office, “between 2003 and 2010 federal

57. Id. at 324–25.
58. See supra notes 55–57. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is
required to provide notice and comment for any rule revisions to comply with its 1992 equal
employment opportunity provisions. 47 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1) (2018). The Federal Aviation
Administration is required to engage in notice and comment rulemaking before amending “air tour
management plan[s]” so that planes may fly over national parks and tribal lands. 49 U.S.C.
§ 40128(b)(4)–(6) (2018). And, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to engage in
notice and comment rulemaking when modifying fuel regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2018).
59. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture is required to abide by § 553 when
consolidating or reforming milk marketing orders. 7 U.S.C. § 7253(b)(1) (2018).
60. For example, HHS is required to hold a “public notice and comment period” before it modifies
certain categories and classes of prescription drug coverage. 43 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G)(iii) (2018).
61. For example, “the DEA has defined good cause in terms of whether ‘the conditions of public
health or safety necessitate an earlier effective date.’” United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099,
1104 (8th Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original). Also of note, courts typically afford agency guidelines
and manuals some level of deference. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)
(deferring to guidelines that an agency created without engaging in notice and comment rulemaking);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (finding that a congressional statute granted an agency
discretion to formulate guidelines).
62. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing S. DOC. NO.
79-248 (1946)).
63. California v. HHS, 281 F.3d 806, 832 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
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agencies issued about 35% of major rules and about 44% of nonmajor
rules without a notice of proposed rulemaking.”64 Of the rules
promulgated without a notice of proposed rulemaking, “77% of major
rules and 61% of nonmajor rules” invoked the good cause exemption.65
Therefore, this emergency exit is starting to look like the main exit.
There are numerous reasons an agency may invoke the good cause
exemption. Stanford University Administrative Law Professor Anne
Joseph O’Connell notes “[a]n agency’s choice of rulemaking
process . . . is strategic.”66 The traditional notice and comment
rulemaking process is often a long, drawn out, and costly process for
agencies, especially during times of political divisiveness, when
government agencies and political actors cannot easily come to a
consensus about a rule.67 Thus, the good cause exemption provides
agencies the flexibility to react quickly to emergencies or avoid political
conflict, while assuring the public some level of postpromulgation
review.68 However, Congress did not establish the good cause exemption
for agencies to evade political scrutiny.69 Courts will invalidate IFRs when
an agency clearly intended to avoid “high conflict public comment
periods.”70 In other words, agencies may not avoid notice and comment
procedures strictly for political reasons.
Another prevalent reason agencies invoke the good cause exemption is
compliance with immediate legislative (i.e., statutory) deadlines and court

64. JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44356, THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION TO NOTICE
COMMENT RULEMAKING: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION 1, 1 n.2 (2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44356.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV5F-LWYR] (The GAO report adopted
the definition of major rules in the Congressional Review Act, which distinguishes between major
rules and nonmajor rules. Major rules are those determined by the office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to, among other things, have or be likely to have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2018)) (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-13-21, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO
RESPOND TO PUBLIC COMMENTS (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VX4U-4E67]).
65. Id. at 1 n.3. In a study of the 4,658 final regulatory actions published in the Federal Register in
1997, about half were published without a notice of proposed rulemaking. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFF., GAO/GGD-98-126, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES OFTEN PUBLISH FINAL ACTIONS
WITHOUT
PROPOSED
RULES
2
(1998),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/226214.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LN6S-YYFM].
66. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 917.
67. Id.
68. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 291.
69. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 918.
70. Id.
AND
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orders.71 For example, at issue in Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC72 was the
agency’s published “propos[al] to eliminate all race- and gender-based
provisions” of an existing rule for broadband wireless internet licenses.73
While the FCC had not been ordered by a court or Congress to do so, it
proposed this rule to avoid constitutional challenges in the wake of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand Constructors v. Peña,74 which
held “strict scrutiny must be applied to all racially based government
actions . . . [and] such actions ‘are constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.’”75 The
FCC’s regulations withstood challenges for lack of good cause, not on
constitutional grounds, but because the FCC “was under a congressional
deadline to act quickly”76 and a delay “would undermine the public
interest by delaying additional competition in the wireless marketplace.”77
Since the constitutional issues were litigated and decided in Adarand, the
FCC had no reason to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution in its statement of reasons for issuing the rule.78 Instead,
the FCC merely had to describe the litigation and time delay as a reason
for issuing its rule.79 Together, these descriptions were enough for the
FCC to establish a valid use of the good cause exemption.
Additional reasons agencies invoke the good cause exemption tend to
track Congressional intent: in response to emergency situations;80 to
create interpretative rules rather than substantive or generally applicable

71. See generally EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(holding that the EPA validly invoked good cause exemption after litigation on the matter because
public comment would not have provided new information); Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620,
630 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the FCC validly invoked good cause to comply with a
“congressional deadline to act quickly”); United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding that the EPA validly invoked good cause to comply with statutory amendments); Am. Fed’n
of Gov’t Emps. v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that while the USDA validly
invoked good cause to comply with a court order and prevent public concern, the USDA did not have
good cause to make the rule permanent).
72. 78 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
73. Id. at 627.
74. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
75. Omnipoint Corp., 78 F.3d at 627 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
76. Id. at 630.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 636.
80. See, e.g., Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that
there was no statutorily-imposed emergent situation or another emergency present where the EPA
relied on an emergent situation claim).
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rules;81 and to promulgate internal agency regulations.82 As discussed
further in Section I.C, an agency cannot shield its rule from judicial
review by invoking any of the aforementioned good cause rationales.
Procedurally, when an agency invokes the good cause exemption and
issues a rule, it must provide “finding[s] and a brief statement of reasons”
justifying its use.83 In United States v. Dean,84 the Eleventh Circuit upheld
the Attorney General’s use of the good cause exemption because the
Attorney General published its rule with an adequate statement of
reasons.85 The statement of reasons provided guidance to “eliminate any
possible uncertainty about the applicability of” the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act.86 The Eleventh Circuit also held that
the Attorney General had properly invoked the good cause exemption
because its use avoided the potential procedural delay of reregistering sex
offenders during a notice and comment period, which could “do real
harm” to the public.87
In the absence of either findings or a statement of reasons, courts will
invalidate a rule on procedural grounds without considering the merit of
the agency’s good cause exemption. Likewise, courts will invalidate a rule
if the substance of its findings or statement of reasons is inadequate.
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC88 illustrates courts’ unwillingness to
uphold IFRs without proper findings and statements of reasons.89 In
Tennessee Gas, the D.C. Circuit found the agency’s statement of evidence
and reasoning for implementing the good cause exemption insufficient
because it did not provide data, facts, or examples to support its
reasoning.90
Anytime an agency relies on the good cause exemption, it runs the risk
that a court may invalidate the regulation on either procedural or
81. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (holding that the TSA’s procedural changes were actually legislative and thus subject to notice
and comment); United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that a U.S. Park
Service rule was invalid because it was substantive rather than interpretive).
82. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that the SEC
did not satisfy good cause exception when it promulgated a rule in anticipation of management
changes).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2018).
84. 604 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2010).
85. Id. at 1277.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1281 (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1979)).
88. 969 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1145–46.
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substantive grounds.91 Because the aforementioned rationales—statutory
deadlines, court orders, emergency situations, interpretive regulations,
and internal agency operations—have, at times, passed judicial muster,92
it is uncommon to find agency rules invoking good cause for any other
reason.
C.

Judicial Review of Good Cause

For courts to hold that an agency validly relied on the good cause
exemption to promulgate an IFR, they must determine that § 553’s notice
and comment requirements were “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary
to public interest.”93 As discussed above, agencies’ use of the good cause
exemption can be improper on procedural or substantive grounds. For
example, a rule relying on the good cause exemption may be procedurally
invalid because it was not “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
public interest” for the agency to go through notice and comment
procedures.94 A rule relying on good cause may be substantively invalid
because the agency failed to properly explain the harm it relied upon in its
notice.95 If a court invalidates an agency’s rule for failing to follow proper
procedures, there is no need to continue analyzing the rule—it is per se
invalid.96 If an agency follows the correct procedures, a court will consider
91. See Section I.C for further discussion of judicial review of good cause exemptions.
92. See supra notes 71 & 80–82.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2018).
94. Id.
95. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 317 (“[W]hen it appears that an agency haphazardly or
pretextually claimed any of the statutory exemptions from notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements in an effort to either avoid bureaucratic hassle or expedite the agency’s policy
preferences, a court could justifiably infer that the agency was unlikely to have taken
postpromulgation public input seriously. Correspondingly, courts should also consider the time the
agency spent considering comments before promulgating the rule in final form.”) (citing Advocates
for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
96. In Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016), employees with
the position of “service advisors” alleged that their automobile-employer violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act’s (FLSA) overtime payment provision. Id. at 2120. In 2010, the U.S. Department of
Labor (DOL) published an interpretation of the FLSA’s provision by defining “salesman.” Id. The
Court considered whether DOL adequately explained its reasoning for considering certain comments
persuasive when it issued the 2011 rule. Id. at 2120, 2127. The Court held that DOL failed to meet its
procedural requirements, so the rule’s definitions would not be afforded Chevron deference. Id. at
2126–27. Because the lower courts relied on the definitions from a procedurally flawed rule—and in
doing so the lower court improperly provided DOL with Chevron deference—the Court vacated the
lower court’s judgment and remanded the case. Id. By 2018, Encino Motorcars had made its way
back to the Court to determine whether, without regard to administrative deference, the term
“salesman” encompasses the term “service advisors.” 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1139 (2018). The
Court found that it did. Id.
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whether or not to afford that agency’s rule some level of deference.97 This
Section broadly discusses the tools courts use to review agency decisions,
as well as the factors courts consider when reviewing good cause
exemptions.
1.

Standard of Review for Good Cause

When drafting the APA, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
imposed upon the courts the duty of preventing agencies from using the
good cause exemption as a tool for avoiding the APA’s rulemaking
requirements.98 To survive judicial scrutiny, the “[c]ause found must be
real and demonstrable.”99 To determine whether the cause relied upon is
real and demonstrable, courts consider whether an agency “provide[d] the
requisite specific and particularized explanation that the courts require to
substantiate a valid good cause claim.”100 As briefly discussed in
Section I.B, “courts tend to be skeptical of generic assertions of a need for
immediate guidance” or regulation absent notice and comment.101 For that
reason, “courts generally limit the scope of the [good cause] exception to
truly unusual circumstances, such as when public safety is threatened or
advance notice of a rule might undermine its application.”102 That being
said, courts’ consideration of whether an agency “properly invoked ‘good
cause’ proceeds case-by-case, sensitive to the totality of the factors at
play.”103
Courts generally review agencies’ good cause actions de novo or with
a mix of de novo and arbitrary and capricious review.104 Pursuant to § 706
of the APA,105 courts review agencies’ good cause actions de novo in at
least three instances: (1) when agency decisions involve constitutional

97. Id.
98. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing S. REP. NO. 79752, at 31 (1945)).
99. Id.
100. Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 532 (2013).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 612 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193,
1200 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
104. United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 506–09 (3d Cir. 2013).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2018).
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matters;106 (2) when agency decisions interpret judicial opinions;107 and
(3) when agency decisions implicate rulemaking procedures.108 De novo
review may overlap with arbitrary and capricious review when there are
claims of procedural deficiencies.109 In fact, § 706 explicitly provides that
courts should “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”110
Courts may use § 706(2)(A)’s arbitrary and capricious standard as a
fallback when they find that the agency’s reasoning conflicts with
statutory intent or the agency fails to provide any reasoning at all.111 For
example, in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,112 the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration revoked a seatbelt regulation.113 The Court, using arbitrary
and capricious review, found that the agency’s rescission of the seatbelt
regulation conflicted with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act’s intent to reduce traffic accidents and improve traffic standards,114
and the agency “failed to supply the requisite ‘reasoned analysis’” for the
rescission.115 Therefore, the agency’s action was unlawful under the APA.
The Court held the arbitrary and capricious standard to be the correct
standard of review to determine whether (1) an agency’s decision to
revoke a regulation conflicts with statutory intent and (2) an agency
provided reasoning for its actions.116
Because courts may review agencies’ use of the good cause exemption
de novo or under arbitrary and capricious review, the circuits are split
regarding whether some level of deference can be afforded to “an
agency’s assertion of good cause under § 553(b)(B).”117 Under arbitrary
106. Id. § 706(2)(B); see, e.g., Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000) (considering
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause); St. Francis Hosp. Ctr. v. Heckler, 714 F.2d 872 (7th
Cir. 1983) (considering the Fifth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C), (D).
108. Id. § 706(2)(D).
109. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (1977).
110. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
111. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (citing
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971)).
112. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
113. Id. at 34, 41.
114. Id. at 48.
115. Id. at 57.
116. Id. at 33.
117. United States v. Brewer, 766 F.3d 884, 888, 890 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that under de novo
review and “even under an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, there is an insufficient
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and capricious review, courts may afford an agency’s procedures and
decisions some level of deference,118 but courts may not under de novo
review.119 While some courts have skirted this issue,120 others have held
that no deference should be afforded to agency good cause actions
“although the [APA] itself presumes that review of agency action under
arbitrary-and-capricious standard is ‘highly deferential.’”121 Thus, it
remains an open question whether courts could properly afford some level
of deference to agency decisions to invoke the good cause exemption.122
2.

Judicial Review of Constitutional Matters

It is unusual for administrative agencies to enact IFRs solely on
constitutional grounds, so there is little case law and literature analyzing
judicial review of regulations invoking good cause for constitutional
reasons. Therefore, it is beneficial to discuss how federal courts generally
review constitutional matters.
Typically, the federal judiciary avoids deciding constitutional
matters.123 Traditional principles of separation of powers encourage the
Judicial, Legislative, and Executive branches to stay in their lanes. Courts
act strategically to stay in good standing with the legislature, executive,
and public by avoiding hot-topic and value-laden issues, including
constitutional issues.124 Courts are encouraged to keep peace with the
legislature because Congress has the power to confirm and impeach
judges, as well as expand and constrict judicial power,125 among other
reasons.

showing of good cause for bypassing the APA’s requirements of notice and comment and preenactment publication”) (first citing United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099, 1105 (8th Cir. 1977);
then citing United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 506–07 (3d Cir. 2013)); GARY LAWSON,
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 458 (7th ed. 2016) (citing Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507–09).
118. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 508.
119. Id. at 506.
120. Id. at 508.
121. Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 846 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (first citing
Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2001); then citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 728 F.2d 1477, 1486–87 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1983)).
122. LAWSON, supra note 117, at 458 (first citing Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507–09; then citing
Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
123. See Neal K. Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and
Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2212, 2215 (2015); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1202–08 (2006).
124. See supra note 123.
125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Courts commonly employ the canon of constitutional avoidance to
dodge deciding constitutional issues.126 In other words, a court reviewing
an agency regulation, invoked to remedy a constitutional harm, will likely
attempt to decide the matter without reaching the constitutional question.
To avoid the merits of a constitutional claim, a court may rule on
procedural or statutory grounds.127 The maneuver to avoid constitutional
issues is a court’s way of leaving through its own emergency exit door.
3.

Additional Judicial Considerations of Good Cause

Courts consider numerous factors to decide whether agencies properly
invoked the good cause exemption. For example, courts consider whether
Congress enacted a statute that imposes additional restrictions on the use
of the good cause exemption or provided an alternative rulemaking
exemption.128 If such a statute exists, courts may review its legislative
history to understand Congress’s intent.129 Courts also consider whether
agency-made guidelines impact rulemaking130 and whether the
administrative record “offer[s any] other indications of an agency’s
motives for foregoing prepromulgation notice and comment.”131 Another
consideration is whether the court would do more harm than good by
invalidating the regulation.132
When reviewing good cause actions, courts generally hold that “an
administrative agency is required to balance the necessity for immediate
implementation against principles of fundamental fairness”133 regarding
its impact on individuals. Courts also agree that “a balance . . . must be
struck, even in time[s] of emergency, between regulatory efficiency and
the procedural safeguards created to protect representative government,
curb agency overreach, and promote agency transparency.”134
While the good cause exemption is “a flexible standard, . . . courts have
said that it ‘is to be narrowly construed and only reluctantly
126. See supra note 123.
127. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, 666 F.3d 1216, 1222
(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001)).
128. For discussions regarding congressional intent, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 236 (2001), and Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 857 (1984).
129. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 236.
130. California v. HHS, 281 F.3d 806 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
131. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 317 (citing Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v.
Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
132. Hickman, supra note 100, at 471.
133. United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099, 1105 (8th Cir. 1977).
134. Boliek, supra note 46, at 3341.
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countenanced,’ with its use ‘limited to emergency situations.’”135 Yet, in
Dean, the Eleventh Circuit held that to implicate the good cause
exemption “there does not need to be an emergency situation . . . . [T]he
[agency] only has to show that there is good cause to believe that delay
would do real harm.”136
Courts recognize that agencies are “not likely to be receptive to
suggested changes once the agency ‘put[s] its credibility on the line in the
form of “final” rules. People naturally tend to be more close-minded and
defensive once they have made a “final” determination.’”137 In New Jersey
v. EPA,138 the D.C. Circuit noted that creating an opportunity for
postpromulgation comment is an insufficient remedy for failing to follow
notice and comment rulemaking procedures.139 Therefore, agencies
utilizing the good cause exemption and engaging in a postpromulgation
comment period must demonstrate to courts that they are committed to
keeping an open mind during the comment period and prior to enacting a
final rule.140
Courts have also addressed the question of whether statutory or court
deadlines are sufficient reasons for invoking the good cause exemption.141
At issue in Methodist Hospital of Sacramento v. Shalala142 was whether
statutorily imposed implementation deadlines justified HHS’s use of the
APA’s good cause exemption.143 The D.C. Circuit found the good cause
exemption was justified because of the statute’s strict time constraints,
noting that “[b]etween the April 20 enactment and the September 1
deadline, the Secretary faced the daunting task of preparing regulations to
implement a complete and radical overhaul of the Medicare
reimbursement system.”144 Due to these time constraints, the court found

135. Nick Bagley, The New Contraception Rule Is Procedurally Flawed, TAKE CARE (June 1,
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-new-contraception-rule-is-procedurally-flawed [https://per
ma.cc/JV7Z-7F7L] (quoting Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
136. United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275, 1281 (11th Cir. 2010) (narrowly interpreting the good
cause exemption).
137. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated on
other grounds, 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
138. 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
139. Air Transp. Ass’n, 900 F.2d at 1049.
140. New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1042.
141. Id. (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1979)).
142. 38 F.3d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
143. Id. at 1236.
144. Id. at 1237.
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that the Secretary of HHS had not abused the good cause exemption.145
However, in U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA,146 the Fifth Circuit held that “the
mere existence of deadlines for agency action, whether set by statute or
court order, does not in itself constitute good cause for a § 553(b)(B)
exception.”147 The EPA’s argument that complying with this particular
congressionally imposed deadline constituted good cause for forgoing
notice and comment did not persuade the court.148 Thus, while the good
cause exemption could be implicated when Congress creates a statute or
a court order imposes a strict deadline for agency action, the mere
existence of deadlines for agency action is not necessarily enough to
constitute good cause.
Additionally, courts have held that the harm agencies claim in order to
implicate the good cause exemption may not be overly general or broad.149
In Sorenson Communications, Inc. v. FCC,150 the D.C. Circuit, reviewing
an FCC action de novo, held that the record was “too scant to establish a
fiscal emergency” and that while “no particular catechism is necessary to
establish good cause, something more than an unsupported assertion is
required.”151 Therefore, to uphold the good cause exemption, courts must
find the harm claimed by agencies to be demonstrable and immediate—
like war, health crisis, or economic collapse.152
While agencies may rely on the good cause exemption to address public
health and welfare harms, courts must ensure those harms are immediate
enough to warrant bypassing notice and comment procedures.153 For
example, in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt,154 the Eighth Circuit
upheld the use of the good cause exemption because the challenged rule
generally addressed public concerns—the reservation of landing and
takeoff times at airports.155 But, in United States Steel Corp., the Fifth
145. Id. (citing Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(distinguishing the situation in New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1043–45, where a statutory deadline was
“insufficient to establish good cause”)). For further discussion regarding statutorily imposed deadlines
see Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1201–03 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
146. 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979).
147. Id. at 213 (citations omitted); see also New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1042 (citing U.S. Steel Corp.,
595 F.2d at 213).
148. U.S. Steel Corp., 595 F.2d at 213.
149. Id. at 214 (“This exception should be read narrowly.”).
150. 755 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
151. LAWSON, supra note 117, at 459 (citing Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc., 755 F.3d at 707).
152. See U.S. Steel Corp., 595 F.2d at 214.
153. See infra notes 154–58.
154. 645 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1981).
155. Id. at 1322.
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Circuit considered whether the EPA properly invoked the good cause
exemption to promulgate an FR regulating air quality standards for public
health concerns156 and “held that public health concerns, while entitled to
respect, would not have been seriously jeopardized by allowing public
comment.”157 Therefore, for courts to find that an agency is entitled to the
good cause exemption, that agency must articulate how delaying the
effectiveness of a rule would jeopardize the public in some way. In other
words, agencies must plead with particularization.
Agencies may not waive prepromulgation notice and comment
procedures unless their use of good cause is based on a real and immediate
threat to public welfare. In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler,158
the Secretary of HHS raised a good cause claim “to protect life from
imminent harm.”159
The Secretary argue[d] that waiver [of APA notice procedures] is
appropriate because ‘any delay would leave lives at risk.’ Such an
argument could as easily be used to justify immediate
implementation of any sort of health or safety regulation, no
matter how small the risk for the population at large or how longstanding the problem. There is no indication in this case of any
dramatic change in circumstances that would constitute an
emergency justifying shunting off public participation in the
rulemaking.160
Because the D.C. Circuit did not find the circumstances urgent, it
invalidated HHS’s use of the good cause exemption.161
As discussed, courts evaluate agencies’ uses of the good cause
exemption to determine if the agencies’ reasons for and procedures used
to invoke the good cause exemption are valid. To make these
determinations, courts consider a number of factors, including a rule’s
timing;162 legislative and judicial mandates;163 health and safety
matters;164 and public concerns.165 From Dean to American Academy of
156. U.S. Steel Corp., 595 F.2d at 210.
157. Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act’s Good Cause Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L.
REV. 113, 125 (1984).
158. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
159. Id. at 401 (citations omitted).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See supra text accompanying note 137.
163. See supra notes 140–49.
164. See supra notes 152–61.
165. See supra notes 152–56.
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Pediatrics, court decisions clarify which agency rationales constitute
valid good cause.166 These factors and decisions will be revisited below
when evaluating whether constitutional and moral harms constitute valid
rationales for invoking the good cause exemption.
II.

AN ILLUSTRATION: EMPLOYER PROVIDED
CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE

A debate regarding whether or not agencies may invoke the good cause
exemption for constitutional and moral harms recently ensued: On
October 13, 2017, HHS, Treasury, and DOL, acting in concert, published
two nearly identical IFRs in the Federal Register.167 The IFRs extended
religious168 (i.e., constitutional) and moral169 exemptions to the ACA’s
contraceptive coverage requirement. Under the IFRs’ exemptions, certain
employers and insurers that must offer group healthcare coverage were no
longer required to provide contraceptive care coverage to employees.170
This Part provides a brief history of the ACA’s requirement that
employers provide contraceptive coverage in employee health plans,
including subsequent agency rulemaking and legal battles. Next, this Part
discusses the Trump Administration’s IFRs and the lawsuits that
followed.
A.

Historical Overview: Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives

In 2010, Congress enacted the ACA.171 The ACA defines employers in
different categories, such as a “small employer” with one but no more than
100 employees and a “large employer” with at least 101 employees.172
The ACA “requires employers with [fifty] or more full-time employees to
offer ‘a group health plan or group health insurance coverage’ that
provides ‘minimum essential coverage.’”173 “Minimum essential
coverage” includes preventive care and screenings for adults and
166. United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2010); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler,
561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
167. See 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9.
168. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8, at 47,835.
169. 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9, at 47,858.
170. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8, at 47,808–13; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9, at 47,861–62.
171. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 (2018)).
172. Id.
173. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 696 (2014) (citing 26 U.S.C.
§§ 5000A(f)(2), 4980H(a), (c)(2) (2018)).
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children.174 For individuals with reproductive capacity, preventive care
and screenings include “Food and Drug Administration-approved
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and
counseling, as prescribed by a health care provider.”175 Employers who
are statutorily required, but do not provide health insurance coverage, may
be fined per day and per employee they fail to cover.176
Under the ACA, however, one category of employers may seek
exemptions from covering certain essential health benefits. For example,
the aforementioned preventive care and screening requirements for
individuals with reproductive capacity “do[] not apply to health plans
sponsored by certain exempt ‘religious employers.’”177 According to the
ACA, religious employers like churches, non-profit hospitals, and private
education institutions may obtain an exemption from sponsoring
employee health plans with birth control benefits.178 Employees of
religious employers who seek birth control coverage may have to pay outof-pocket or obtain independent insurance to cover related costs.179
In 2011 and 2012, HHS, Treasury, and DOL published IFRs and
notices of proposed rulemaking exempting employers of nonprofit
organizations with religious objections to contraceptive services from
providing such insurance coverage.180 The 2011 IFR, titled “Group Health
Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” amended
a July 2010 IFR.181 The amendments responded to the July 2010 IFR’s
postpromulgation comments made by religious and non-religious
employers concerned with maintaining their faith and complying with the
ACA’s contraceptive coverage requirements.182 As amended, the 2011

174. Preventive Health Services, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/coverage/
preventive-care-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/TG44-KJEZ].
175. Preventive Care Benefits for Women, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/
preventive-care-women/ [https://perma.cc/G9PK-4TX7]; Birth Control Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/coverage/birth-control-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/5T99-R6RA].
176. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 696–97.
177. Preventive Care Benefits for Women, supra note 175.
178. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 698–99.
179. Id. at 741–42.
180. Id. at 698 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b) (2018)).
181. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,621–23 (Aug. 3, 2011)
(amending Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg.
41,726 (July 19, 2010)).
182. Id. at 46,623.

13 - Stiefel.docx (Do Not Delete)

948

5/30/2019 10:54 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:927

IFR provided the Health Resources and Services Administration
“additional discretion to exempt certain religious employers from the
Guidelines where contraceptive services are concerned.”183 The 2011 IFR
also amended the 2010 rules to align with state contraceptive mandates
and exemptions by defining a religious employer as an organization that:
“(1) [h]as the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily
employs persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves
persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization
under . . . the [Internal Revenue] Code.”184
The 2012 notice of proposed rulemaking, titled “Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act,” proposed additional
amendments to ACA-related regulations regarding contraceptive
coverage and religious organizations.185 It stated that HHS, Treasury, and
DOL were committed to developing “alternative ways of providing
contraceptive coverage without cost sharing in order to accommodate
non-exempt, non-profit religious organizations with religious objections
to such coverage.”186 The agencies’ notice indicated their hope of
balancing religious employers’ objections to providing contraceptive
coverage with employees’ rights to preventive healthcare coverage,
including contraceptives.187
Despite the interim and proposed rules exemptions for contraception
coverage, many religiously affiliated employers filed lawsuits asserting
their First Amendment rights against the ACA mandate.188 These
organizations claimed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)189
provided a remedy to religious institutions.190 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby

183. Id.
184. Id. (citing I.R.C. §§ 6033(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)(i), (iii) (2018)). For more information on state
contraceptive mandates and their exemptions, see Rachel VanSickle-Ward & Amanda Hollis-Brusky,
An [Un]Clear Conscience Clause: The Causes and Consequences of Statutory Ambiguity in State
Contraceptive Mandates, 38 DUKE J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 683, 683–708 (2013).
185. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21,
2012).
186. Id. at 16,503.
187. Id.
188. Laurie Goodstein, Catholics File Suits on Contraceptive Coverage, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/us/catholic-groups-file-suits-on-contraceptive-coverage.html
?mtrref=www.google.com (last visited May 10, 2019).
189. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2018).
190. Nick Bagley, Moral Convictions and the Contraception Exemptions, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST:
HEALTH
SERVS.
RES.
BLOG
(June
2,
2017,
9:45
AM),
https://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/moral-convictions-and-the-contraceptionexemptions/ [https://perma.cc/F978-9MLA].
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Stores, Inc., three closely held businesses191 brought an action claiming
that HHS’s contraceptive mandate violated their First Amendment
protected religious freedom, as well as RFRA.192 The U.S. Supreme Court
held that the contraceptive mandate failed RFRA’s “least restrictive
means of furthering that governmental interest” test.193 In doing so, the
Court found that HHS’s contraceptive mandate imposed a substantial
burden on employers of organizations that have religious objections to
certain contraceptive methods and those employers’ exercise of
religion.194 Employing the canon of constitutional avoidance, the Court
did not consider the merits of the First Amendment claims.195
In Wheaton College v. Burwell,196 a private liberal arts college brought
a similar action as in Hobby Lobby, against HHS.197 Wheaton College
challenged HHS’s contraceptive mandate and petitioned the Court for
injunctive relief so that it would not be obligated to provide contraceptive
coverage to its employees and students.198 HHS affords religious
nonprofit organizations exemptions from the contraception coverage
requirement if they complete certain forms.199 In this case, Wheaton
College’s forms had not yet been approved.200 Like in Hobby Lobby, the
U.S. Supreme Court reached its decision—to provide temporary
injunctive relief so that Wheaton College would not be required to provide
contraceptive coverage—without deciding the merits of the First
Amendment claim.201 The Court considered another analogous claim
against HHS’s contraceptive mandate in Zubik v. Burwell.202 In Zubik, the
Court explicitly embraced the canon of constitutional avoidance by
dodging the merits of the case: “the Court does not decide whether
petitioners’ religious exercise has been substantially burdened.”203

191. A closely held business is “[a] corporation whose stock is not freely traded and is held by only
a few shareholders (often within the same family).” Close Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
416 (10th ed. 2014).
192. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 701–702.
193. Id. at 688, 694, 727–32 (citations omitted).
194. Id. at 725–26.
195. Id. at 735–36.
196. 573 U.S. 958 (2014).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 958–59.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
203. Id. at 1560.
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Under the President Barack H. Obama Administration, HHS invoked
the good cause exemption to comply with the Court’s Wheaton College
order.204 Essentially, the Court’s order necessitated a rule change. As
administrative law expert and University of Michigan Professor of Law
Nick Bagley notes, court orders are “classic reasons to find good cause”
actions valid.205 “Indeed, that’s why the D.C. Circuit brushed back an
earlier challenge to one of HHS’s interim final rules: ‘the modifications
made in the interim final regulations are minor, meant only to “augment
current regulations in light of the Supreme Court’s . . . order.”’”206 As
mentioned in Section I.C, the good cause exemption is generally
appropriate when it is used to comply with court orders.
B.

Friday the Thirteenth: The Trump Administration’s Publication of
IFRs

On Friday, October 13, 2017, the Trump Administration’s HHS,
Treasury, and DOL published two nearly identical IFRs in the Federal
Register. The “Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage
of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act”207 and
“Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act”208 provided religious
and moral exemptions and accommodations to employers who provided
healthcare coverage under the ACA. The IFRs allowed employers to
claim an exemption in order to deny employees coverage for
contraceptives and other preventive health services.209 The IFRs’
language was much broader than the exemptions already established in
the ACA210 and the IFRs promulgated by the Obama Administration.211
Unlike the Obama Administration’s IFRs, which invoked the good cause
exemption to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Wheaton
204. Bagley, supra note 135 (discussing Wheaton College, 573 U.S. 958; Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870 (July 2, 2013); Interim Final
Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726 (July 19, 2010));
see also Util. Solid Waste Activities Group v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
205. Bagley, supra note 135.
206. Id.
207. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8.
208. 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9.
209. Id.; 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8.
210. Preventive Care Benefits for Women, supra note 175.
211. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, supra note 185, at 16,503; Group
Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra note 181, at 46,622.
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College order,212 the Trump Administration’s agencies argued that the
ACA’s contraceptive mandate caused religious and moral harms to certain
employers, justifying its use of the good cause exemption.213
Generally, religion is defined as “[a] system of faith and
worship . . . containing a moral or ethical code; esp., such a system
recognized and practiced by a particular church, sect, or denomination.
[C]ourts have interpreted the term religion broadly to include a wide
variety of theistic and nontheistic beliefs.”214 The Trump Administration’s
agencies asserted many rationales for promulgating the 2017 Religious
IFR. First, the agencies claimed that many religious organizations could
not afford to litigate to obtain the injunctive relief secured by Hobby
Lobby.215 Second, the agencies stated that religious organizations suffered
by complying with the ACA.216 Third, the agencies reasoned that invoking
the good cause exemption was necessary to provide certain employers
with immediate relief and to clarify uncertainties.217 Fourth, the agencies
stated that in some instances the contraceptive coverage requirements
“could serve as a deterrent for citizens who might consider forming new
entities.”218 To prove that invoking the good cause exemption was
necessary, the agencies cited RFRA, various legal battles, and disparate
impact concerns as evidence.219 The 2017 Religious IFR made the ACA’s
religious exemption available to any church or religious order, nonprofit
organization, closely held organization, for-profit entity that is not closely
held, non-governmental employer, institution of higher education, and
health insurance issuer.220
The 2017 Moral IFR relied on a moral harm rationale for invoking the
good cause exemption.221 The moral exemption was much broader than
the religious exemption. The term “moral” is defined be Merriam-Webster
as, “of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior,”
“expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior,” “conforming to a
standard of right behavior,” “sanctioned by or operative on one’s
212. See supra note 204.
213. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9.
214. Religion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (10th ed. 2014).
215. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 47,814.
219. Id. at 47,798–801 (citing Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S.__, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014)).
220. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8.
221. 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9.
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conscience or ethical judgment,” etc.222 In the 2017 Moral IFR, the
agencies reasoned that while religious objectors were exempt from
providing contraceptive coverage, neither the ACA nor past IFRs
“offer[ed] an exemption or accommodation to any group possessing nonreligious moral objections to providing coverage for some or all
contraceptives.”223 The 2017 Moral IFR’s statement of basis and purpose
focuses on “individuals and entities with sincerely held moral
convictions.”224 However, the actual language of the IFR does not
explicitly define “moral convictions.”225 Instead, it provides blanket
exemptions to any nonprofit organization and some for-profit
organizations, such as universities and health insurers, that morally object
to contraceptive coverage.226 The exemption is written as
(2) The exemption of this paragraph (a) will apply to the extent
that an entity . . . objects to its establishing, maintaining,
providing, offering, or arranging (as applicable) coverage or
payments for some or all contraceptive services, or for a plan,
issuer, or third party administrator that provides or arranges such
coverage or payments, based on its sincerely held moral
convictions.227
Moral conviction is defined broadly, and the term “coverage or
payments” could be construed to mean that a person who morally objects
to paying insurance coverage in general—rather than specifically objects
to contraceptives—would also be exempt from providing such coverage.
The inherent ambiguity and broadness of the term “moral” can be applied
to many situations (i.e., euthanasia, abortion, gun control, mass
incarceration, environmental protection), thus leaving room for further
manipulation.
While courts228 did not decide the validity of the agencies’ religious
and moral harms claims, courts did permit lawsuits against the Trump
222. Moral,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY
(2018),
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/moral [https://perma.cc/XK3T-TNL3].
223. 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9, at 47,839.
224. Id.
225. Id. (discussing the difference between “religious beliefs” and “moral convictions,” but not
defining either).
226. Id. at 47,862.
227. Id.
228. There were a number of additional cases—utilizing various arguments against the IFRs—
pending, including cases brought by states (e.g., Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Washington) and
by nonprofit organizations (e.g., ACLU). See, e.g., Massachusetts v. HHS, 301 F. Supp. 3d 248
(D. Mass. 2018) (granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment for lack of standing; currently
on appeal to the First Circuit). While this Comment acknowledges the many constitutional, statutory,
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Administration to move forward and, then, resolve those suits on other
grounds.229 The continuance of these lawsuits means that courts generally
found that the plaintiffs had standing, the issue was ripe for judicial
consideration, and the plaintiffs met the preliminary injunction analysis
by demonstrating their claims are likely to succeed. For example, in
California v. HHS,230 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California held that California had Article III and statutory standing to
challenge the 2017 Religious and Moral IFRs when the court issued a
preliminary injunction on December 21, 2017.231 However, in California
v. Azar,232 the Ninth Circuit held that the injunction should be limited to
the plaintiff states, rather than nationwide.233 The HHS Court found that
the economic costs associated with “ensuring that women have access to
no-cost contraceptive coverage” and interest in the “physical health and
well-being of their citizens” satisfied Article III’s standing inquiry.234
California met the APA’s standing requirements, expressed in 5 U.S.C.
§ 702, because the IFRs operated as a final agency action that negatively
impacted its citizens.235
On November 15, 2018, the Trump Administration issued two FRs,
solidifying the 2017 IFRs.236 Ironically, the publication of the 2017 IFRs
and their postpromulgation comment period, satisfied the agencies’ notice
and comment requirements for the 2018 FRs.237 Substantively, the 2018
and common law claims involved in these cases, it focuses on courts’ treatment of the APA’s good
cause exemption for religious and moral harms.
229. See, e.g., California v. HHS, 281 F. Supp. 3d 806 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff
states had standing to sue), aff’d in part, California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 570–73 (9th Cir. 2018).
230. 281 F. Supp. 3d 806 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
231. Id. at 822–23.
232. 911 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2018) (originally filed as California v. Wright, No. 4:17-cv-05789
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2017)).
233. Azar, 911 F.3d at 584.
234. HHS, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 822.
235. Id. at 822–23.
236. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services
Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29
C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) [collectively hereinafter 2018 FRs].
237. Professor Nicholas Bagley explains:
Are the [final] rules legal? Procedurally, HHS is on safer ground now that it’s walked through
notice and comment. To be sure, the courts are sometimes nervous when agencies issue interim
final rules and purport to conduct notice and comment after the fact. If a rule has already gone
into effect, the courts ask, isn’t the notice-and-comment process a farce? Does the agency, at that
stage, really have an open mind about the comments it receives?
Those concerns will certainly be in play here. Oddly enough, though, the fact that the courts put
the initial rules on hold will play into the Trump administration’s hands. Because the interim
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FRs were nearly identical to the 2017 IFRs.238 The states that participated
in Azar, plus a few additional states, immediately challenged the FRs.239
The 2018 FRs were the impetus for the Azar Court to, once again, question
whether states had standing to sue HHS, Treasury, and DOL. On
December 13, 2018, the Azar Court reached a partial decision,240 holding
that the states had standing to sue241 and the controversies surrounding the
IFRs would not be moot until the FRs’ January 14 effective date.242 In
other words, as soon as the 2018 FRs became effective on January 14,
2019, pending litigation surrounding the 2017 IFRs became moot because
there was no longer a “live controversy.”243 Turning to the question of
whether the agencies validly invoked the good cause exemption, the Azar
Court considered the agencies’ claims that they had good cause to bypass
standard procedures to (1) make rules effective immediately; (2) relieve
burdened organizations with religious and moral beliefs; and (3) decrease
insurance costs for organizations with religious and moral beliefs.244
Without generally addressing religious and moral harms, the court found
that none of these three claims were valid.245
The night before the 2018 FRs became effective, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted plaintiff states an
injunction, finding the states were likely to succeed in their arguments
against both the 2018 Religious and Moral FRs.246 On remand, the district
court noted that generally “the courts, not the agencies, are the arbiters of
what the law and the Constitution requires.”247 The court also explained
that the plaintiff states were likely to succeed “in their argument that the
Moral Exemption is not in accordance with the ACA” and they were
final rules weren’t allowed to take effect, they acted in practice like proposed rules. And there’s
nothing anomalous about taking notice and comment on proposed rules.
Nicholas Bagley, The Trump Administration Targets the Contraception Mandate, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/the-trumpadministration-targets-the-contraception-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/3TYU-Y7YF].
238. California v. HHS, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1279 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
239. Compare California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 584 (9th Cir. 2018) (California, Delaware,
Maryland, New York, and Virginia), with HHS, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 1280 (California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and District of Columbia).
240. Azar, 911 F.3d at 566.
241. Id. at 570.
242. Id. at 568–69.
243. Id. at 569.
244. Id. at 576–78.
245. Id. at 578.
246. California v. HHS, 351 F.3d 1267, 1298–99 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
247. Id. at 1293.
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“likely to suffer irreparable harm unless the Final Rules are enjoined to
maintain the status quo pending resolution of the case on the merits.”248
Notwithstanding these developments, neither court definitively
addressed whether litigants could successfully argue that religious or
moral harms are invalid reasons for invoking the APA’s good cause
exemption. In other words, whether administrative agencies can rely on a
constitutional issue, such as religious freedom, or a broad ethical issue,
such as moralism, to invoke the good cause exemption remains an open
question.
The 2017 IFRs and 2018 IFRs illustrate how the Trump Administration
used constitutional and moral harms to bypass notice and comment
rulemaking.249 Part III discusses whether administrative agencies may
validly rely on constitutional or moral harms to invoke the good cause
exemption. This Comment ultimately concludes that constitutional and
moral harms are invalid reasons to invoke the good cause exemption.
III. INVALID HARMS
As discussed in Part I, when determining the validity of an agency’s
good cause exemption, courts will review the agency’s “finding and a
brief statement of reasons” for issuing a rule.250 These statements must
adequately explain why the traditional use of notice and comment
procedures is “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.”251 Using the Trump Administration’s 2017 IFRs as an example,
this Part argues that constitutional and moral objections are invalid
rationales for invoking the APA’s good cause exemption.
A.

Capricious Constitutional Objection

As discussed in Section II.B, litigation against the Trump
Administration called into question the validity of its religious objection
rationale for promulgating its 2017 Religious IFR without going through
notice and comment.252 At the center of the Trump Administration’s
religious objection rule was a First Amendment argument regarding
employers’ religious freedom. This Section discusses the various ways
rules invoking good cause for constitutional claims are invalid, as well as
unnecessary, arbitrary, and capricious.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 1296–97.
See supra Section II.B.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2018).
Id.
Supra Section II.B (referencing California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 567 (9th Cir. 2018)).
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First, many constitutional issues are resolved through litigation. After
a constitutional claim is resolved in court, it would be unnecessary for an
agency to invoke the good cause exemption to publish a rule advancing
the same (i.e., the resolved) constitutional claim. However, this previous
litigation argument could cut the other way. Courts have found good cause
valid after litigation on the matter because public comment would not
have provided new information.253 When good cause is valid after
litigation on a constitutional matter, however, the use of the good cause
hinges on the litigation or court order, rather than the constitutional matter
alone.254
The 2017 Religious IFR provides an example of why administrative
agencies should not invoke the good cause exemption to promulgate a rule
if the harm the rule claims to remedy has already been litigated and
resolved. The content of the 2017 Religious IFR was similar to the Obama
Administration’s rule amendments, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s
rulings in Hobby Lobby, Wheaton College, and Zubik. By offering
employers with religious objections an exemption to the contraceptive
mandate, the 2017 Religious IFR was redundant.255 Because exemptions
for employers with religious objections were provided through past
rulemaking and litigation, the 2017 Religious IFR did not remedy an
immediate risk of harm. Without a particularized and imminent harm, the
2017 Religious IFR was arbitrary.
California v. HHS demonstrates this line of reasoning. The HHS Court
found that the Trump Administration’s claims would likely fail on the
merits.256 Specifically, a court would likely find the Trump
Administration’s contention that individuals are experiencing hardship
waiting on pending RFRA lawsuits and “choos[ing] between the Mandate,
accommodation, or penalties for [noncompliance]” were inefficient
justifications for forgoing notice and comment rulemaking.257 Regardless
of the 2017 Religious IFR, employers maintained the ability to file
litigation to protect their First Amendment or RFRA rights, as well as to

253. See, e.g., EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118, 134–35 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(finding that the EPA validly invoked the good cause exemption to correct a previously, improperly
invoked rule because “commentators could not have said anything during a notice and comment
period that would have changed that fact.” In other words, a comment period would be unnecessary).
254. See supra notes 71, 80–82.
255. Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
573 U.S. 682 (2014); Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958 (2014).
256. California v. HHS, 281 F. Supp. 3d 806, 832 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
257. Id. at 827 (alteration in original).
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file for a waiver from providing contraceptive coverage with HHS.258
Because employers with closely held religious beliefs were already
protected and exempt from providing contraceptive benefits to their
employees,259 there was no immediate threat to the employers’ wellbeing.
Without an immediate harm, the 2017 Religious IFR lacked a justification
to bypass notice and comment rulemaking.
Additionally, previous litigation and subsequent corrective agency
action under the Obama Administration260 resolved the Trump
Administration’s concerns.261 The Obama Administration provided
religious organizations exemptions from the ACA’s contraceptive
mandates.262 Since the 2016 Zubik ruling, neither Congress nor an agency
has enacted legislation or a rule that would substantially change the
requirements of a religious institution to provide contraceptive coverage.
Due to the fact that there were no changed circumstances—the public had
not been subjected to a new, immediate, or greater harm—a court would
have likely found that the 2017 IFRs were unnecessary.
Omnipoint and the 2017 Religious IFR are both examples of agency
rules that were not issued to comply with a court order—despite the 2017
Religious IFR’s constitutional underpinnings.263 Since many IFRs are
promulgated to comply with court orders or statutory mandates,264 it is
odd that the 2017 Religious IFR was not a logical result of compliance
with either a court order or statutory mandate. Unless a court order or a
statute mandates that the agency promulgate a new rule, previously
litigated or legislated constitutional issues moot the need to issue a rule
without notice and comment.265 Without a mandate or other particularized
rationale, it is arbitrary and capricious for an agency to promulgate a rule
bypassing notice and comment procedures.266
Second, constitutional issues are for Congress or courts to determine.267
As discussed in Section I.C, the judiciary avoids making decisions on

258. California v. HHS, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1277 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
259. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682; see also supra Section II.A.
260. See supra Section II.A.
261. See supra Section II.B.
262. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, supra note 185, at 16,503.
263. Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8.
264. See supra Section I.B.
265. See supra Sections I.B, I.C.
266. See supra Sections I.B, I.C.
267. See supra Sections I.B, I.C.
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constitutional issues.268 Given the structure of the three branches of
government, the executive branch is responsible for leading and carrying
out the laws, the judiciary is responsible for ensuring the laws are being
carried out faithfully and adequately, and the legislature is responsible for
drafting and expanding laws.269 Because Congress is the only body with
the ability to proactively amend the U.S. Constitution, it should be the
main constitutional speaker.270 Administrative agencies should take a
chapter out of the judiciary’s playbook and also engage in constitutional
avoidance.
To demonstrate, consider the various tactics that the Azar Court did or
could have done to avoid the 2017 Religious IFR’s constitutional issue:
The court could have avoided addressing the constitutional
issue by invalidating the 2017 Religious IFR for procedural
deficiencies.
The court could have avoided the constitutional issue by
claiming Congress is in a better position to enact laws than
the Judiciary or Executive (via administrative agencies). For
example, the court could have found that Congress spoke to
the issue of religious exemptions for contraceptives when it
enacted the ACA.271 In fact, the ACA initially granted
religious employers like churches, non-profit hospitals, and
private education institutions an exemption from sponsoring
employee health plans with contraceptive benefits.272
Because Congress addressed the issue of religious
exemptions when it enacted the ACA, the 2017 Religious IFR
would be considered arbitrary and capricious. Additionally,
Congress maintains the ability to broaden or narrow the
ACA’s religious exemption. Applying this rationale to
similar agency actions, courts should determine that
Congress, rather than the Judiciary or Executive, are better
equipped to effectuate the public will.273
The court could have avoided ruling on constitutional
grounds by claiming the constitutional harm addressed by the
2017 Religious IFR was previously litigated and resolved by
Hobby Lobby, Wheaton College, and Zubik, and the Obama
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See supra Section I.C.
U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(2) (2018).
Id. § 1402(g).
Supra Sections I.B, I.C.

13 - Stiefel.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

5/30/2019 10:54 AM

INVALID HARMS

959

Administration’s IFRs.274 The court could have argued that
this precedent resolved the constitutional issue, rendering the
2017 Religious IFR unnecessary, arbitrary, and capricious.
Even when courts engage a constitutional issue, they tend to argue that
the constitutional issue is best left for Congress, rather than an agency or
court to resolve. This comes back to the principles of separation of powers
and the judiciary’s goal of maintaining peace between itself and the
Legislative and Executive branches.275 Thus, to dodge constitutional
issues, courts are likely to (1) focus on the IFR’s procedural flaws;
(2) argue Congress is in a better position to enact laws than the Judiciary;
or (3) claim that since the constitutional issue was previously litigated and
resolved, the IFR is unnecessary, arbitrary, and capricious.276
Third, constitutional issues are broad and have the potential to impact
large swaths of Americans. For that reason, constitutional issues are of
great importance to the American public and should require notice and the
opportunity to comment. With the time constraints and costs of
rulemaking,277 constitutional issues should be left to Congress. Unless an
agency takes the time to employ proper notice and comment procedures,
Congress will arguably be more representative than agencies and impose
more checks and balances than agencies.
B.

Misguided Moral Objection

Congress, federal courts, and commentators have expressed concerns
that agencies may abuse the good cause exemption.278 This is a concern
that the good cause exemption and the administrative agency’s political
leanings will overcome public participation.279 Political abuse is apparent
when agencies use the good cause exemption on hot-topic or political
issues,280 such as contraceptive coverage,281 to bypass the lengthy notice
and comment rulemaking procedures. This abuse is also evident when the
good cause exemption hinges on broad and subjective reasoning,282 such
274. Supra note 255.
275. Supra Section II.C.2.
276. See supra note 253.
277. See supra Part I.
278. See supra Part I.
279. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 910–11.
280. Id.
281. For up-to-date news regarding contraceptive coverage see Contraception and Insurance
Coverage (Religious Exemption Debate), N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/topic/subject/
contraception-and-insurance-coverage (last visited May 10, 2019).
282. See supra Section II.B.
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as a moral objection. This Section discusses the various ways rules
invoking good cause for moral objections are invalid.
As discussed in Part I, the very nature of the good cause exemption is
already broad and subject to agency abuse. The availability of the good
cause exemption as a method for agencies to bypass the traditional notice
and comment procedures is one that Congress intended to be used
sparingly and in times of emergency.283 Courts have affirmed this specific
instance of congressional intent—or more accurately, courts have
affirmed congressional avoidance of the term moral—in numerous
cases.284 For example, in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, the
D.C. Circuit found an interim rule dealing with moral and ethical concerns
to be arbitrary and capricious because “had Congress intended [§ 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794] to reach so far into such
a sensitive area of moral and ethical concerns it would have given some
evidence of that intent.”285 The Court believed that the decision to clarify
and amend the Rehabilitation Act to address moral concerns was
Congress’s,286 noting that Congress may clarify and amend a statute if
intended to cover moral and ethical concerns.287 Additionally, while one
Congress member mentioned the word “moral” in discussions regarding
amending § 553, the term “moral” was excluded from the APA.288 In
addition to leaving out the term “moral” in the APA, Congress avoided its
use in HHS-related statutes, such as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.289
Viewing the 2017 Moral IFR as an example, the HHS Court addressed
and dismissed the Trump Administration’s moral harm rationale.290 The
court noted that the moral objection “markedly expanded the scope of the
exemption available to religious entities under the ACA’s contraceptive
coverage mandate, and created an entirely new exemption based on moral
objections.”291 The moral exemption to the ACA’s contraceptive mandate

283. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214–15 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the
EPA “failed to show [a] strong enough reason to invoke the § 553(b)(B) exception” and that the
“exception should be read narrowly”; reasoning that if the court were to accept the EPA’s reasoning,
it would “make the provisions of § 553 virtually unenforceable”).
284. See supra Section II.B.
285. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 402 (D.D.C. 1983).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Lavilla, supra note 20, at 324 n.29.
289. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 561 F. Supp. at 402.
290. California v. HHS, 281 F.3d 806 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
291. Id. at 813.
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broadens the scope of the ACA so greatly that notice and comment
procedures were warranted.292
The broad scope of the moral objection would have caused the 2017
IFRs to be arbitrary and capricious. In addition to providing employers
exemptions, the IFRs permitted health insurance companies to utilize
these exemptions.293 Therefore, insurance companies owned or managed
by individuals with religious or moral objections to providing group
health insurance coverage of contraceptives and other preventive care
could have obtained an exemption from doing so.294 With employers and
insurance companies opting-out of providing contraceptive coverage,
individuals’ access to contraceptives and preventive health care would be
severely limited. This limitation conflicted with the ACA’s goal of
making comprehensive and “affordable health insurance available to more
people.”295
Additionally, like in American Academy of Pediatrics, a court could
find that, when the ACA was enacted and subsequently amended,
Congress had the opportunity to include a moral exemption. Congress
could have and, in the future, may broaden or narrow the ACA’s
exemptions. Because Congress addressed the issue of contraceptive
coverage, the Trump Administration’s decision to promulgate the 2017
IFRs was arbitrary and capricious.
The broad and subjective nature of the term “moral” may be why, until
the Trump Administration, agencies had not relied on a moral claim. In a
legal sense, moral typically refers to “the study . . . of human conduct, of
right and wrong behavior.”296 The broad scope of what constitutes a moral
objection opens the door to agency—and in the case of the 2017 IFRs,
possibly employer—abuse. And, one could argue that such a broad harm
likely fails New Jersey’s requirement that harms be real and
demonstrable.297 Thus, while a moral harm may seem like a novel way to
avoid notice and comment rulemaking, it should be an invalid use of the
good cause exemption. Just as Congress has the power to amend the ACA,
it also has the power to amend § 553 of the APA to specify what

292. Id.
293. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9.
294. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9.
295. Affordable Care Act, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/affordablecare-act/ [https://perma.cc/3R6S-MU3M].
296. Moral, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (10th ed. 2014).
297. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing S. DOC. NO.
79-248, at 200 (1946)).

13 - Stiefel.docx (Do Not Delete)

962

5/30/2019 10:54 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:927

constitutes good cause.298 Essentially, Congress’s power to amend the
good cause exemption acts as a check on administrative agencies. If
agencies continue to improperly rely on moral harms to invoke the good
cause exemption,299 Congress should amend the APA; reminding the
agencies that when an emergency exit door is opened an alarm bell rings.
C.

Two Objections are Not Better than One

When two identical IFRs are published in the Federal Register—
regardless of the validity of the individual rules—courts should be
skeptical. Courts should be concerned that the publication of two nearly
identical rules are (1) unnecessary, arbitrary, and capricious; (2) a
political ploy to avoid the traditional and lengthy notice and comment
rulemaking; or (3) both. Using the 2017 IFRs as an illustration, this
Section explores two reasons courts should find that an agency cannot
validly rely on the good cause exemption to publish multiple nearly
identical IFRs.
First, courts should find that two nearly identical rules are unnecessary,
arbitrary, and capricious. Considered together, the 2017 Religious and
Moral IFRs were redundant. This redundancy would have rendered the
2017 IFRs unnecessary, arbitrary, and capricious. For instance, the broad
scope of the 2017 Moral IFR may have covered the 2017 Religious IFR
and vice versa. In other words, the agencies could have reached the same
aims and results by promulgating one instead of two IFRs.
The dictionary definitions, referenced in Part II,300 help explain how
the 2017 Moral IFR makes the 2017 Religious IFR redundant: Moral is
defined as “of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior,”
“expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior,” “sanctioned by
or operative on one’s conscience or ethical judgment,” etc.301 Religion is
defined as “[a] system of faith and worship . . . containing a moral or
ethical code . . . . [C]ourts have interpreted the term religion broadly to
include a wide variety of theistic and nontheistic beliefs.”302 Because the
definition of religion contains the phrase “a moral or ethical code”303 in
some instances, it may cover moral beliefs and vice versa. Similarly,
because the definition of moral contains “ethical judgment,” in some
298. See supra Section I.A.
299. See supra Section II.B.
300. See supra Section II.B.
301. Moral,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY
(2018),
webster.com/dictionary/moral [https://perma.cc/XK3T-TNL3].
302. Religion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (10th ed. 2014).
303. Id.

https://www.merriam-
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instances, it may cover religion’s “theistic and nontheistic beliefs” and
vice versa.
Given these definitions, an individual with a religious objection to
contraceptive coverage may have achieved the same result by relying on
the 2017 Moral IFR, and an individual with a moral objection to
contraceptive coverage may have achieved the same aim by relying on the
2017 Religious IFR. When either one of the 2017 IFRs was promulgated,
it eliminated, or at least relieved, the emergency situation that the agencies
relied on to invoke the good cause exemption and promulgate the other
2017 IFR. Therefore, as soon as one of the 2017 IFRs was published, the
other IFR became redundant, unnecessary, and arbitrary. Courts should
look skeptically at two nearly identical rules, like the 2017 IFRs, to
determine whether there is an emergency warranting the double use of the
notice and comment exemption and whether the that double use is
necessary.
Second, when faced with two nearly identical rules, courts should ask:
Did the agency publish these rules as a political maneuver? And, was it
the agency’s goal to avoid the lengthy notice and comment rulemaking
procedures? To answer these questions, courts must look at the rules’
substance, procedures, and context. An agency could publish two nearly
identical rules as a form of insurance: if a court invalidates one rule—on
substantive or procedural grounds—the agency may still enforce the other
rule. In other words, duplicative rules could be deployed on newsworthy
topics in anticipation of litigation. Using the 2017 IFRs as an illustration,
HHS, Treasury, and DOL may have reasoned that if the 2017 Religious
IFR was invalidated, the 2017 Moral IFR could remain in place. If that
were the case, because the 2017 Moral IFR was broad enough to capture
the same aim as the 2017 Religious IFR, the agency would still have
achieved its initial goal. The strategy of publishing two rules in
anticipation of litigation would impermissibly allow agencies to escape
the participatory notice and comment rulemaking requirements. Thus,
courts should invalidate rules employed using this type of agency action.
Similarly, courts may review the context in which an agency published
two nearly identical rules and find that the agency published them to avoid
a lengthily notice and comment period because the rules touch on a
politically contested issue. Using the 2017 IFRs as an illustration, a court
could look at the rules’ context and conclude that the agencies published
them as political tools to restrict access to contraceptives and other
preventive health services while escaping public discourse via a notice
and comment period. As the Ninth Circuit noted when granting plaintiff
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states injunctive relief in California v. Azar,304 courts should find that the
agencies impermissibly used the 2017 Religious and Moral IFRs to escape
notice and comment rulemaking.305 When courts find that an agency
improperly relied on the good cause exemption to escape notice and
comment rulemaking for political reasons, they must void the rule.306
When two duplicative rules are at issue, courts should consider voiding
both rules.
In sum, two nearly identical rules are not better than one rule. Courts
should find nearly identical rules redundant and therefore unnecessary,
arbitrary, and capricious. Additionally, when agencies publish two nearly
identical rules, courts should be skeptical of their use as a political ploy to
avoid the notice and comment rulemaking.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional and moral harms are invalid reasons for invoking the
APA’s good cause exemption to notice and comment rulemaking. The
Trump Administration’s 2017 interim final rules—which broadened
contraceptive coverage exemptions for employers with religious and
moral objections—provide an illustration.
The 2017 IFRs invalidly relied on the APA’s good cause exemption to
the time-consuming, but more democratic, notice and comment
rulemaking procedures. First, past legislation, litigation, and agency
rulemaking resolved the First Amendment issues the agencies relied on to
promulgate the 2017 Religious IFR. Without changed circumstances, the
2017 Religious IFR was unnecessary because the public had not been
subjected to a new, immediate, or greater harm. Second, the 2017 Moral
IFR was overly broad and impermissibly expanded the good cause
exemption from its purpose as a “safety valve” to an “escape hatch.”
Third, the publication of two nearly identical IFRs was redundant,
unnecessary, and arbitrary. The publication of the 2017 Moral IFR
eliminated the emergency situation that the agencies relied on to invoke
good cause and promulgate the 2017 Religious IFR. In general, when
agencies publish nearly identical rules, courts should review those rules
skeptically to ensure the rules are not being used to escape notice and
comment rulemaking procedures.
The use of constitutional and moral objections will broaden
administrative agencies’ ability to bypass notice and comment rulemaking
304. 911 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2018); see supra Section II.B.
305. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations
omitted).
306. See id.
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proceedings and delegitimize the rulemaking process. Repeated use of
constitutional and moral objections to invoke the good cause exemption
will endanger the participatory government principles that Congress
proscribed when it promulgated the APA’s notice and comment
rulemaking requirements. In sum, administrative agencies should not rely
on constitutional or moral harms to invoke the good cause exemption.
And, if agencies do rely on them, Congress and the courts should remind
the agencies that when they open an emergency exit door, an alarm bell
rings.

